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Foreword 
Rex E. Lee* 
It is appropriate that this groundbreaking issue of the BYU jour-
nal of Public Law should deal with a subject that is both doctrinally 
profound and also of great practical importance. Recent decades have 
seen significant increases in land use planning efforts by governments 
at all levels. Necessarily, these efforts have resulted in the diminu-
tion-and in many cases the virtual elimination-of property values. 
Does the Constitution provide any protection against such exercises of 
governmental power? Under what circumstances may land use regula-
tion amount to a "taking," for which the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments to the Constitution require just compensation to be paid? 
The cornerstone of our modern regulatory takings jurisprudence is 
the Supreme Court's 1922 decision in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon/ 
authored by Justice Holmes. To many people of that day, Holmes' au-
thorship of the Pennsylvania Coal opinion must have come as some-
thing of a surprise. It was the same Justice Holmes who, having wit-
nessed the "grasping and predatory industrialism"2 of his day, 
frequently advocated construing the fourteenth amendment narrowly 
and the state police power broadly. In fact, some thought that his judi-
cial opinions gave legislatures a virtual free rein to regulate economic 
growth and development. 8 
Pennsylvania Coal involved a Pennsylvania law, the Kohler Act, 
which prevented coal companies from mining coal in certain areas. The 
law was designed to prevent surface subsidence and its accompanying 
problems and appeared to be the kind of reasonable exercise of the 
police power that in Justice Holmes' view would fall safely within the 
legislative power. Nonetheless, seven other Justices joined with Justice 
*Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University; Partner, Sidley 
& Austin, Washington D.C.; J.D. 1963, University of Chicago; Solicitor General of the United 
States 1981-1985. The author was counsel of record for the property owners in the recent Su-
preme Court regulatory takings case Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 55 
U.S.L.W. 4326 (U.S. March 9, 1987) (No. 85-1092). The decision is discussed in this Foreword. 
1. 260 u.s. 393 (1922). 
2. M. LERNER, THE MIND AND FAITH OF JusTICE HoLMES xxvii (1943). In speeches to 
law students during the later years of his life Justice Holmes revealed that he was "saddened at 
the sordid commercialism he saw, both among industrialists and among lawyers." /d. 
3. !d. at 185. 
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Holmes in holding that the statute, by failing to provide compensation 
to coal companies for the coal they were forced to leave under the 
ground, violated the fifth amendment of the Constitution. "We are in 
danger of forgetting", Justice Holmes wrote, "that a strong public de-
sire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving 
the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the 
change."4 
Times have changed greatly since 1922. Many more people popu-
late the United States, making our nation's land an even more precious 
commodity. During the past 65 years great quantities of natural re-
sources have been consumed or manufactured into other products. The 
extraction and use of these resources have been the source of significant 
air, water and land degradation, some of it possibly irreversible. 
Thus, the issue the Supreme Court faced when it decided Pennsyl-
vania Coal in 1922 is more sharply defined today, largely because of 
increasing societal concern about the way we use and abuse our natural 
resources. To what extent may government impose limits on the use of 
privately owned land before it can be said that private property has 
been "taken" for public use, requiring "just compensation" ?5 This is-
sue has surfaced repeatedly in the Court in recent years, though we 
have not yet progressed much beyond the ambiguous Pennsylvania 
Coal rule that if governmental regulation "goes too far" a taking may 
occur.8 
Most recently, in what many observers thought would be a replay 
of Pennsylvania Coal, a Supreme Court majority of five held that 
Pennsylvania's Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation 
Act (the "Subsidence Act"), which requires 50% of the coal beneath 
certain protected structures to be kept in place, was not a per se taking 
of private property.7 Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis,8 
4. Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 416. 
5. This debate has existed since the early days of our nation. It was no secret that the Feder-
alists wanted to secure the right of private property ownership from democratic incursions. R. 
SCHLATfER, PRIVATE PROPERTY 190 (1951). Opponents of the Federalist view, on the other 
hand, held that "the prerogatives of property were as fit to be abridged as those of princes." /d. at 
192. Out of this conflict emerged the fifth amendment "which became the chief legal barrier to 
popular demands for the limitation of private ownership." /d. at 194. Interestingly enough, it was 
the anti-federalists who insisted on the amendment. They saw the amendment as "an explicit 
guarantee of the rights of nature", i.e., an assurance that property ownership was not reserved for 
a favored few. /d. at 193. 
6. Justice Holmes wrote: "The general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated 
to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." Pennsylvania Coal, 
260 U.S. at 189. 
7. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n. v. DeBenedictis, 55 U.S.L.W. 4326 (U.S. Mar. 9, 1987) 
(No. 85-1092). The majority consisted of Justice Stevens, who wrote the opinion, and Justices 
Brennan, Marshall, White and Blackmun. 
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the modern day counterpart of Pennsylvania Coal, distinguished,9 but 
did not overrule, Justice Holmes' 65 year old opinion. Keystone's major 
thrust may well be that times really have changed.10 Justice Stevens, 
writing for the majority, compared Keystone with Pennsylvania Coal, 
focusing on what he regarded as differences between the legislative pur-
poses underlying the two Pennsylvania subsidence statutes involved in 
the respective cases. The Kohler Act, he noted, was enacted to prevent 
damage to "some private landowners' homes."11 The Subsidence Act, 
on the other hand, was enacted "to protect the public interest in health, 
the environment, and the fiscal integrity of the area."12 Thus, the ma-
jority implied that the effects of subsidence in Pennsylvania today are 
more acute than they were in 1922, justifying an extension of the police 
power. Such an implication is strengthened by the fact that the stated 
purposes of the Kohler Act and the Subsidence Act are virtually the 
same.13 
After recognizing the public interests at stake, the majority later 
explicitly held that the subsidence in Pennsylvania was akin to a public 
nuisance and that police power restrictions were therefore justified.14 
This was a bold step, which, as the dissent noted "suggests an excep-
tion far wider than recognized in ... previous cases."111 While the cen-
tral purposes of the Subsidence Act included public safety concerns (the 
traditional concerns of the police power), the Act reflected economic 
concerns as well. Chief Justice Rehnquist voiced disagreement with al-
lowing "a regulation based on essentially economic concerns to be insu-
8. ld. 
9. /d. at 4329. The majority divided Justice Holmes' opinion into two parts: 1) the decision 
of the case at hand, i.e., the injury to the Mahons' specific property; and 2) the portion of the 
opinion discussing the general validity of the Kohler Act. The Keystone majority called the second 
portion of Justice Holmes opinion "uncharacteristically ... advisory .... " ld. at 4330. This 
characterization might appear odd to Justice Holmes who wrote to his close friend, Frederick 
Pollock, in November of 1922 that he believed the Pennsylvania Coal decision "to be a compact 
statement of the real facts of the law and as such sure to rouse opposition for want of the custom-
ary soft phrases." Letter from Justice Holmes to Frederick Pollock (November 26, 1922) quoted 
in LERNER, supra note 2, at 185. 
10. The majority specifically stated that the Subsidence Act was "a prime example that 'cir-
cumstances may so change in time ... as to clothe with such a [public] interest what at other 
times ... would be a matter of purely private concern.'" Keystone, 55 U.S.L.W. at 4331 (citing 
with approval Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 155 (1921)). 
II. Keystone, 55 U.S.L.W. at 4331. 
12. ld. 
13. For a comparison of the two statutes see this issue, Berger, The Year of the Taking Issue, 
I BYU J. Pus. L., 261, 287 (1987). 
14. Keystone, 55 U.S.L.W. at 4331. 
15. /d. at 4337 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
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lated from the dictates of the Fifth Amendment by labeling it nuisance 
regulation. " 16 
By its terms, the fifth and fourteenth amendments' takings guaran-
tee could be construed as applying only to exercises of the eminent do-
main power. Under this view, the constitutional guarantee would come 
into play only in those circumstances where governmental action has 
not only diminished the individual's net worth, but has also enriched 
the government or someone designated by the government. However, it 
has been clear since at least as early as 1922 when Pennsylvania Coal 
v. Mahon was decided that the takings clause is not so limited; there 
are some circumstances under which governmental exercise of its regu-
latory authority may amount to a taking for which the Constitution 
requires that compensation be paid. 17 Keystone does not disturb that 
basic ruling. Neither, however, does it do much to clarify the law. Con-
troversy will continue over the kinds of governmental regulation that go 
"too far" and which therefore amount to effective takings. 18 Accord-
ingly, the importance of the issue with which this volume deals seems 
assured for at least the immediate future. 
16. Id. at 4338. 
17. The Supreme Court recently affirmed that so-called "temporary regulatory takings" fit 
within this category. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale vs. County of Los 
Angeles, California, 85-1199 Slip Op. (U.S. Supreme Court June 9, 1987). For a detailed discus-
sion of the Lutheran Church see this issue Berger, The Year of the Taking Issue, BYU J. Pub. L. 
261-303 (1987). 
18. Following the recent Supreme Court decision in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n., 
86-133 (U.S. June 26, 1987), controversy is likely to increase regarding the proper standard of 
review of the ends-means relationship between the purposes of land-use regulations and the means 
applied in holding that a condition placed upon a development permit was an improper use of the 
police power, the court stated that "the evident constitutional property (of conditions placed upon 
building permits) disappears, ... if the condition substituted for the prohibition utterly fails to 
further the end advanced as the justification as the prohibition." ld. For a discussion of the Nollan 
case see this issue, Berger, The Year of the Taking Issue, 1 BYU J. Pub. L. 261, 315 (1987). 
